Chapter 3

Geophysical Landscape & Battlefield Analysis

This chapter looks at battle elements - (historic/battle) events and (physical) features – in/near southern battlefield Landscapes to assess prior assumptions¹ about these areas itemized in the 2013 Plan/2010 Study. In doing this, it uses geophysical field study or ground-truthing of features (land area, landform, natural, built, below-ground) and reference materials. This analysis reviews the: 1) Initial stage and route of Gen’l. Howe’s tactical northern outflanking maneuver, 2) Military activity of the Crown Force eastern advance, 3) American military activity; 4) Crown Force baggage/supply caravan logistics, and 5) Civilian impact/involvement in the battle.

For local planning purposes, this analysis seeks to clarify the Landscapes’ roles as to what (events) occurred and where (features) it occurred in order to identify relevant features, develop planning strategies (Chapter 5) and speak to heritage interpretation themes (Chapter 6). This chapter takes a historic military view of the battle in these Landscapes, providing related recommendations for future action, planning, or study; while Chapter 4 focuses on built features and battle impacts on the local community. These chapters work in sync to provide a more holistic view of the battle in these Landscapes.

Reference materials used include the 2010 Study KOCOA analysis, 2013 Plan defining features and historic resources inventories, reference maps (historic atlases, aerial photographs, topographic maps), primary sources (firsthand accounts, road petitions, deeds), secondary sources (battle histories), field study, and historic archeological assessment, as well as review of battle-era cultural topography and settlement patterns in Chapter 4. The historic and military archeological project consulting team conducted this analysis with assistance from researchers in Chester County Archives.

KOCOA Military Terrain Analysis

KOCOA² analysis evaluates physical geography and cultural topography and identities defining features that help explain a battle and inform about its events and outcomes. ABPP describes defining features as those natural and built features named in battle accounts, historic maps, or other sources that help locate and ground-truth battle events in the modern landscape. Physical geography (natural) feature examples include terrain, watercourses, ridges, or ravines. Cultural topography (built) feature examples include places/settlement patterns (villages, farms); structures (mills, houses, meetinghouses); or other manmade features (roads, paths, woodlots, farm fields). The 2010 Study KOCOA analysis is used in the 2013 Plan, which takes a further look at defining features for

¹ Appendix A green italics wording shows 2013 Plan assumptions being studied in this project from a battle timeline perspective.
² Appendix A further describes KOCOA analysis. Cultural topography encompasses the built environment and is addressed in Chapter 4.
planning and interpretation purposes. Both are the starting points for this chapter.

Phase 2 uses KOCOA to analyze, update, and/or interpret previously understood battle events related to these Landscapes - where the initial stage of the Crown Force dividing into two columns strategy took place, as did American military activity, Crown and American Forces skirmishes and civilian involvement/impacts. For example, Phase 2 uses KOCOA to better understand the battle event of the flanking march route via mapping and comparing locations of: reported civilian property losses, battle-era properties and owners, and battle-era roads, through which the path of the march becomes evident. Since battle events are not isolated activities, to understand how the Landscapes fit into the overall battle from a military and physical terrain perspective, analysis at times stretches beyond Landscapes’ outlines. Figures 3-1a and 3-1b provide updated KOCOA defining features related to military activity in/realted to the Landscapes.

![Figure 3-1a: Northern and Eastern Columns Landscapes and related KOCOA Military Terrain Defining Features (updated from the 2010 Study and 2013 Plan)](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEFINING FEATURE</th>
<th>LANDSCAPE</th>
<th>KOCOA CATEGORY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1777 Kennett Square village site (modern Kennett Square Borough)</td>
<td>Northern &amp; Eastern</td>
<td>Key Terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill along 1720 Road &amp; 1720 Road north of &amp; through Kennett Square village (modern Union Hill Cemetery/local name of ‘Hessian Hill/Unionville Rd/ Rt. 82/ Union St)</td>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>Cornwallis’ column formation Cornwallis’ column Avenue of Approach, Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1720 Road (modern Union St/Unionville Rd/ Rt. 82)</td>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>Cornwallis’ column Avenue of Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1774 (resurvey) Doe Run Road (modern East Doe Run Rd)</td>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>Cornwallis’ column Avenue of Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Ground at 1774 (resurvey) Doe Run Road/ 1728 Road to the Great Valley/Pre-1707 Marlborough Street Road juncture: Lt. Col. Ross’ Patrol’s probable observation point &amp; where he sent his message to Gen’l Washington (modern E Doe Run Rd/Northbrook Rd/ Rt. 926 intersection) Initial skirmishing between Ross’ Patrol &amp; Northern Column starts here and stays relatively continuous as the flanking march advances.</td>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>Vantage point for American Light Infantry Observation, Fields of Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1728 Road to the Great Valley (toward Trimble’s Ford) (modern Northbrook Rd/Red Lion Rd)</td>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>Cornwallis’ column Avenue of Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1742 Road (modern Corrine Rd)</td>
<td>Trimble’s Ford Landscape</td>
<td>Area where Ross’ Light Infantry engaged the rear Northern Column Avenue of Approach, Field of Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Ground east of Kennett Square village along/follow line of 1723 Road (modern McFarlan Rd to Schoolhouse Ln)</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>Knyphausen’s column formation. Knyphausen’s column Avenue of Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743 Great Nottingham Rd (modern Baltimore Pike/Rt. 1)</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>Knyphausen’s column Avenue of Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welch’s (later Anvil) Tavern skirmish site. Gen’l Knyphausen reports first shots of battle fired from woods east of tavern. (modern Rt. 1/Webb Barn Ln juncture)</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>First American position, commanded. Cover &amp; Concealment, Field of Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamorton village skirmish site - Elevation north of 1743 Great Nottingham Rd at Hamorton village (west of modern Rt. 52/Rt. 1 intersection at Hamorton village)</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>Second defensive American position. Cover &amp; Concealment, Field of Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Kennett Meetinghouse skirmish site - Elevation southeast of Old Kennett Meetinghouse. Hill elevation was removed during Rt. 1 construction. (modern Rt. 1 at Old Kennett Meetinghouse)</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>Third defensive American position. Cover &amp; Concealment, Field of Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnamed wooded Hill (elevation) &amp; Fencing east of Old Kennett Meetinghouse skirmish site (near modern Hickory Hill Rd./Rt. 1 intersection</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>Fourth defensive American position. Reported to be ambush. Cover &amp; Concealment, Field of Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743 Great Nottingham Rd/1760 Road juncture (modern Rt. 1/Brinton’s Bridge Rd intersection)</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>Knyphausen’s column/sent British 1st Brigade along the 1760 Road² Avenue of Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baggage &amp; Supply Wagon Train - 1759 Road to Wilmington or 1767 Road to 1754 Brandywine Road (modern Kennett Pike or Hickory Hill Rd to Hillendale Rd/Fairvale Rd)</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>Baggage Train Avenue of Approach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 In this plan use of these words means the following: ‘Road’ indicates the approximate battle-era road alignment and roadbed still exists. ‘Spur’ is the approximate road extension of a battle-era road that still exists. ‘Trace’ indicates a former battle-era road that today is largely an archeological site.

2 Eastern Battlefield Phase 3 Study begins from this point east.
Roadways - as communication routes, avenues of approach, and observation points for military logistics - are critical KOCOA defining features for battlefield military strategy analysis as well as cultural topography and battle-era settlement pattern analysis. Understanding what roads existed at the time of the battle is necessary for understanding primary reports from the field of battle and locations where battle events would have likely occurred. One of the extraordinary outcomes of this project is research undertaken by Chester County Archives, whereby a portrayal of the battle-era road network (as well as property tracts and owners in Chapter 4) has been mapped using the best-known primary source reference materials available at the time of this plan. For example, this allows possible troop routes to become more apparent when compared with historical battle accounts.

KOCOA is further explained in terms of military terrain analysis from an on-the-ground view: a soldier looks at fields, woodlots, ridges, buildings, waterways, etc., for their military value, how they could be integrated into offensive or defensive positions, and how they fit into potential for offensive or defensive military action. This is not only important for understanding why a commander would (or would not) position infantry, artillery, or cavalry at a certain place on the terrain or at a certain point during the engagement (why faulty positioning could have disastrous consequences), but also helps to interpret the authenticity of battlefield maps. Further, evaluation of terrain from a military point of view can help provide reasonable explanations to ‘fill in’ gaps in current knowledge of battle events caused by a scarcity of primary

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### Figure 3-1b: Associated Approach and Encampment Landscapes and related KOCOA Military Terrain Defining Features

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defining Feature</th>
<th>Landscape</th>
<th>KOCOA Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1777 Kennett Square village site (modern Kennett Square Borough)</td>
<td>Approach &amp; Encampment</td>
<td>Key Terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743 Great Nottingham Road (modern Baltimore Pike/Rt. 1)</td>
<td>Approach &amp; Encampment</td>
<td>Knyphausen’s column Avenue of Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High ground east of Kennett Square village along/follows line of 1723 Road (modern McFarlan Rd to Schoolhouse Ln)</td>
<td>Encampment</td>
<td>Location of Knyphausen’s column camp. Knyphausen’s column Avenue of Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill along 1720 Road &amp; 1720 Road north of &amp; through Kennett Square village (modern Union Hill Cemetery/local name of ‘Hessian Hill’/Unionville Rd/Rt. 82/Union St)</td>
<td>Encampment</td>
<td>Location of Cornwallis’ column camp. Cornwallis’ column Avenue of Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1740/1773/1770 Newport-Gap Pike ‘Road to Lancaster’ (modern Newport-Gap Rd/Rt. 41)</td>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>Knyphausen’s column Avenue of Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1710 Road/Limestone Road (modern Newark Rd)</td>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>Knyphausen’s column Avenue of Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1710 Road/Limestone Road (modern Limestone Rd)</td>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>Knyphausen’s column Avenue of Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Garden Meetinghouse</td>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>American militia skirmish with Crown Forces joining Knyphausen’s column Avenue of Approach, Field of Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Route toward Red Clay Creek west branch. Possibly closely followed modern Chandler’s Mill Rd. Route was over difficult terrain with no established roads by 1777; route likely via farm lanes and by-roads.</td>
<td>Approach (in Kennett Twp.)</td>
<td>Cornwallis’ column Avenue of Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Clay Creek, its banks and valley</td>
<td>Approach (in Kennett Twp.)</td>
<td>Cornwallis’ column Obstacle, Avenue of Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Route to/ford across/from Red Clay Creek west branch. Route was over difficult terrain with no established roads by 1777; likely route used farm lanes and by-roads.</td>
<td>Approach (in Kennett Twp.)</td>
<td>Cornwallis’ column Obstacle, Avenue of Approach, Key Terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Route to/from Hockessin To Hockessin -1710 Road/the Limestone Road (modern Limestone Rd) to modern Valley Rd &amp; headwaters of Mill Creek. From Hockessin - modern Valley Rd to 1740 Road (modern Old Wilmington Rd) to 1740 Road (modern Ewart Rd) to modern Chandler Mill Rd) (Crown Force route in area of modern Valley Rd was/is swampy. Likely used farm lanes and by-roads)</td>
<td>Approach (in DE &amp; into &amp; in Kennett Twp. &amp; PA)</td>
<td>Cornwallis’ column Avenue of Approach, Obstacle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
sources. For example, military usage of terrain would demand troops be deployed under the cover of landforms and natural features, such as ridges, woodlots, or low-lying ravines, shielding troops from the enemy’s view. Similarly, depending on the task assigned during any stage of an engagement, troops might be deployed via a road if speed is of the essence or via a woodlot or circuitously if the element of surprise is paramount. Taking these and similar military aspects into consideration, terrain becomes an integral part of the reconstruction of battle events and ‘the stage’ in which the events unfold.

A KOCOA analysis is a valuable tool for planning and interpretation purposes, as it identifies extant features that still define the battle/battlefield and that are paramount to protect for all efforts in preserving the battlefield and history of the battle in the American Revolution and as part of Chester County’s legacy. Future actions should be made with a focus on protection of such features, including lands and structures.

Southern Battlefield Military Analysis

The analysis discusses the Landscapes from a military battle perspective, exploring battle events that took place within and/or are related to these Landscapes. It also takes into account Landscapes’ significance (Chapter 2) and the broader battle (Appendix A), as well as historic context (Chapter 4) and themes (Chapters 2 and 6). This analysis was completed by the project consultant and Battlefield Park Education Coordinator, so prose may read differently than other plan sections. Refer to Figures 3-1a and 3-1b for battle-era features approximate correlation to modern features.

The analysis focuses on a short period of time, September 8 through the morning of September 11. Previous studies of the battle, while addressing Crown Force reach to Kennett Square and to Brandywine Creek, have not specifically focused on the actual movements of the formations. This project focuses on those movements and has identified routes, confirmed sources or locations, refined and/or discovered new routes. This KOCOA has provided some new and/or revised interpretations of the battle. Important among these is a better understanding of Crown Force routes on September 9 and 10, the extent/layout of the Crown Force Kennett Square encampment and troop lines/positions on September 10 into 11, understanding both columns formations/locations on the morning of September 11, refining the Northern Column lower flanking route on the morning of September 11, verifying the Eastern Column’s route on the morning of September 11, and the Baggage and Supply Train movement/route/location on September 11.

Associated Approach & Encampment Landscapes

Encampment and Approach Landscapes as associated areas are described in a KOCOA analysis to understand the military history and to set the underpinning for the events of both columns Landscapes. In other plan chapters, Encampment and Approach Landscapes are discussed after North and Eastern Columns Landscapes as they are considered associated for planning purposes; however in this chapter they are discussed before due to battle event time sequencing as the Crown Force approach in PA from DE (September 9 & 10) and then their overnight camp around Kennett Square (September 10) took place prior to the formation of two columns (September 11).

After his landing at the Head of Elk in Maryland in late August 1777, Gen’l Howe’s Crown Forces marched into DE and had reached northern New Castle County near Hockessin, DE the evening of September 8 and early morning hours of September 9 after a strenuous journey. Upon arriving at this location, Gen’l Howe made his headquarters at the residence of Daniel Nichols that was located along historic/modern Limestone Rd. An interpretive sign was recently installed to commemorate this historic site. The Crown Force encampment that surrounded Gen’l Howe’s headquarters occupied a large geographic area and took advantage of high ground adjacent to the Pike Creek Valley. While the Crown Forces bivouacked and rested for much of the day on September 9, Gen’l Howe formulated his plans to confront Gen’l Washington. The American Army under Gen’l
Washington had already set up an encampment in Newport, DE by the morning of September 8. With the Crown Force encampment nearby, the opposing armies were bivouacking in close proximity to one another. The afternoon of September 8, there was a skirmish between the opposing forces along Mill Creek north of Milltown, DE. Pre-dawn September 9, American Force left their encampment in Newport, DE heading towards Chad’s Ford to cross the Brandywine Creek and take up a defensive position along its eastern heights near Chad’s Ford.

On September 9, Gen’l Howe orders to his army were to leave the encampment along the 1710 Limestone Road in two columns, as he had done in New York a year earlier. Each column was to take a separate route to rendezvous at the initial location of Welch’s Tavern along the 1743 Great Nottingham Road (near modern Longwood Gardens’ entrance on Baltimore Pike). One column, commanded by Gen’l Knyphausen, which contained the baggage and supply provisions of the army (“Baggage and Supply Wage Train”), was to embark on a safer and longer route while the rest of the Crown Force army acted as a screen taking a shorter route. According the scribe of the Hessian Regiment Erbprinz, Gen’l Knyphausen’s column “lined up as English Jager Corps, Queen’s Rangers, 2nd Battalion 71st Regiment of Foot, Regiment von Mirbach, Baggage, Supply wagons, cattle, Regiment Von Donop, Combined Battalion, 40th Regiment of Foot {with its two 3lb cannon} 1 officer and 20 dragoons as rearguard, the 1st and 3rd Battalion 71st Regiment of Foot to cover the left flank.” (Erbprinz 1777:10). Primary sources state that Gen’l Knyphausen’s column commenced their march in the early afternoon. Capt. Muenchhausen wrote, “At one o’clock in the afternoon […] Knyphausen was ordered to march with his division.” They also indicate that the column’s departure was very slow and drawn out as the same source noted, “it was almost six o’clock before his rear guard left the camp grounds” (Muenchhausen 1974:30).

After a few hours of Gen’l Knyphausen receiving his orders, Gen’l Cornwallis and Gen’l Howe, with the main body of the Crown Forces, commenced their “shorter” march. Leaving camp on Limestone Rd., they turned east on approximately today’s Valley Rd. toward Hockessin. According to Maj. John Andre, that column was also much delayed in beginning their march. He wrote, “…The Army received orders to be in readiness to march at 1 O’clock in the afternoon in two columns. The troops however did not move until sunset.” (Andre 1904:83). Little did the commanding generals know when they began their march, their column would have an exceedingly difficult night. According to a Hessian officer Von Wurmb, Gen’l Cornwallis was led by “the guide who took General Washington across the Brandywine” and “was captured and gave us good information. The guide knew the way through an area where all houses were occupied, where there are many loyalists and where there will be no shortage of news.” (Wurmb 1998:10). The march, however, was on “undefined,” “indefinite”, and “bad” roads that proved too difficult for Gen’l Cornwallis’ larger Crown Force column. By midnight, Gen’l Howe issued a universal halt and made camp at “Hockessin Meeting House-Quaker Meeting 4 miles distance…[from Nichol’s House Headquarters]” (Montressor 1881:132). After realizing that it would be impossible for his forces to make it to Welch’s Tavern given the strenuous march, Gen’l Howe set a plan into motion to rendezvous with Gen’l Knyphausen in the village of Kennett Square instead. To ensure that one column did not get mixed with the other upon arriving, Gen’l Howe had to ensure Gen’l Knyphausen’s division did not arrive at Kennett Square before Gen’l Cornwallis’ Division. After this realization, Gen’l Howe issued orders for a small party to seek out and order Gen’l Knyphausen to stop at New Garden Meetinghouse. Capt. Muenchhausen recorded, “General Howe sent me and one of my comrades, Captain Knight, together with 12 dragoons, back with orders for Knyphausen’s division to stop at New Garden Meeting, which we would have to pass.” (Muenchhausen 1974:30).

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1 Modern Chadds Ford was spelled as Chad’s ford at the time of the battle. Since this Chapter is largely a military history description of the battle, the 18th century spelling is largely used when speaking of the ford location.
The Army Marched at Dawn

Chapter 3 – Battlefield Analysis

Defining Features for Crown Force movements into PA, September 9-11, 1777.
1. 1740/1773/1720 Newport-Gap Pike ‘Road to Lancaster’ (modern Newport-Gap Rd/Rt. 41), 2. 1710 Limestone Road (modern Newark Rd)
3. Undefined farm lanes and by-roads (generally following modern Chandler Mil Rd) and leading to the 1720 Road (modern Union St)
4. New Garden Meetinghouse
5. Red Clay Creek, its banks and valley
6. 1743 Great Nottingham Road (modern Baltimore Pike/Rt. 1)
7. High Ground east of Kennett Square along the 1723 Road (modern McFarlane Rd/Schoolhouse Rd).

The party rode into the dark night to attempt to find Gen’l Knyphausen. Capt. Muenchhausen also wrote that they had “rode for 10 miles in territory we did not control, and twice came upon rebel dragoons who fired at us…” (Muenchhausen 1974:30). Much to their dismay, at approximately 1AM on September 10, they discovered that Gen’l Knyphausen was entirely too far past the New Garden Meetinghouse and was already approaching Kennett Square from the west. For Gen’l Knyphausen to return to New Garden Meetinghouse would have been virtually impossible. Gen’l Knyphausen’s column halted and camped on the west side of Kennett Square for the remainder of the night of September 9. While returning to Gen’l Howe to report on where Gen’l Knyphausen’s left hand/western column was situated, Capt. Muenchhausen, Capt. Knight, and the twelve dragoons encountered two Crown Force brigades that were “on their way to General Von Knyphausen at New Garden” (Muenchhausen 1974:30). Gen’l Howe, in addition to the orders he had issued for Gen’l Knyphausen to halt, had also ordered the 3rd and 4th Brigades under Gen’l James Grant to detach from Gen’l Cornwallis’ column and move to reattach to Gen’l Knyphausen’s column. Gen’l Grant was ordered to “take the same Route with General Von Knyphausen to support him in case of necessity, as Washington’s Route was uncertain” (Robertson 1930:46). The march for the 3rd and 4th Brigades was difficult as they attempted to attach with Gen’l Knyphausen’s column. Maj. Andre gave an insightful description of the ordeal by writing, “the 3rd and 4th brigades were at first in the right hand column, but the road being found very bad, were ordered together with a brigade of artillery and the baggage of that column, to turn back and take the road General von Knyphausen had marched. This movement was attended with a great deal of trouble and protracted the march of the Brigade in the rear til near 3 o’clock the next day” (Andre 1904:82).

When Gen’l Knyphausen’s division passed New Garden Meetinghouse earlier on the evening of September 9, his route was that of New Garden Rd. to the 1740/1773/1720 Newport-Gap Pike. The division then continued towards Mercer’s Mill (at today’s Avondale Borough) at which point the column turned east on the 1743 Great Nottingham Road (today’s Baltimore Pike), heading east through today’s Toughkenamon and reaching the west side of Kennett Square before being ordered to halt. Maj. Andre’s route however was quite different. According to Maj. Andre “it was with some difficulty at a crossroad that it was ascertained which way the front of the column had passed.” (Andre 1904:82). The crossroad that Maj. Andre references is most likely the intersection of
the 1710 Limestone Road/1720 Road (modern Newark Rd./New Garden Rd.) where New Garden Meetinghouse is located. To expedite the rendezvous with Gen’l Knyphausen, the 3rd and 4th Brigades turned north along the 1710 Limestone Road instead of taking the longer route Gen’l Knyphausen had taken. Damage claims filed by local residents nearby support this finding.

While the 3rd and 4th Brigades were attempting their long and slow march to Gen’l Knyphausen, Gen’l Howe’s and Cornwallis’ column were resting at Hockessin Meetinghouse along the 1740 Road (today’s Old Wilmington Rd. The scribe from the Erbprinz Regiment recorded that Gen’l Howe’s and Gen’l Cornwallis’ column “resumed its march at 5 o’clock in the morning [of September 10] and joined the first division at 9 o’clock in the morning at Kennett Square” (Erbprinz 1777:12). Archibald Robertson recorded a similar time frame by writing “at daybreak we march’d a short way to Kennet’s [sic] Square and Join’d General Von Knyphausen at 10 o’clock. Gen’l Howe’s and Gen’l Cornwallis’ division continued on “undefined roads”. Their route north is considered to be in the vicinity of a 1740 Road/modern Old Wilmington Rd., to a 1740 Road/modern Ewart Rd., then Chandler Mill Rd., which led into the valley of Red Clay Creek’s West Branch and to a ford crossing (approximately near the northern junction with modern Kaolin Rd). Their route then led north nearly straight uphill toward the Gregg house on Round Hill (through today’s Round Hill Rd. subdivision) before it encountered historic/modern West Hillendale Rd. at the with historic/modern Old Kennett Rd. This would have placed the column approaching Kennett Square from the south, arriving in Kennett Square village on historic/modern Union St.

Importantly, this project found and employed historical documentary sources that have not been previously used in interpreting the battle and its movements; these are significant new sources, particularly Gen’l Knyphausen’s October 17, 1777 report and its associated letters and reports. Using historical sources, contemporary mapping, and building on the 1777 road network mapping prepared by Chester County Archives, a significant new insight into the battle found from this strategic landscapes study is that troop movements on September 9-10 in Red Clay Creek Valley and Brandywine Valley was on battle-era roads and farm lanes. The importance of Red Clay Creek Valley in Gen’l Howe’s operations (as well as Gen’l Washington’s to be studied under a Phase 3 project) in the days leading to the battle is significant new information about the battle. Further, importantly this project found that documentation indicated Gen’l Howe, while at his temporary headquarters at Hockessin Meetinghouse, came to the same conclusion (as Gen’l Washington had¹) to fight on Brandywine Creek, but did so almost 15 hours later, at about 5:30pm on September 10. While Gen’l Howe’s plan to outflank Gen’l Washington on the Red Clay Creek was thwarted, he responded swiftly to the opportunity to potentially destroy the American Army at Brandywine. Additionally, this project confirmed that Gen’l Knyphausen’s Division marched to Avondale on The 1740/1773/1720 Newport-Gap Pike, but a Crown Force detachment instead followed modern Newark Rd. on September 9/10, and identified a skirmish site at New Garden Meetinghouse on September 10.

Both columns arrived at Kennett Square on the morning of September 10. The entire Crown Force Army of British, Hessians, and Loyalists and had taken up positions in two locations. Maj. Baurmeister wrote that the army camped “in unequal lines... on the heights at Kennett Square” (Baurmeister 1957:105). Another officer, Capt. Johann Ewald of the Hessian Field Jäger Corps also recorded that at Kennett Square “…the army brigades rested one behind the other” (Ewald 1979:81). The scribe for the Regiment Erbprinz reported that both Gen’l Knyphausen’s and Gen’l Cornwallis’ divisions camped “on the heights beyond” Kennett Square village “in uneven lines” (Erbprinz 1777). The Crown Force Army configuration in two parallel lines meant that Gen’l Cornwallis’ Division was encamped along the line of modern Rt. 82/Union St. in Kennett Square Borough, extending north [from the vicinity of today’s railroad line/South St.] to beyond the crossroads of Kennett Square village by approximately ½ mile (into today’s Kennett Township near Rt. 1 bypass) toward Marlborough Meetinghouse²

1 Documentation indicated that Gen’l Washington decided to fight on Brandywine Creek by midnight on September 9, probably at his headquarters in Newport, DE (or earlier at the field meeting at Harlan’s house and mill near Milltown, DE). The shift of the army to the Creek was a deliberate American choice to offer battle at that point, which will be discussed further in future Phase 3 Eastern Battlefield strategic landscapes planning.

2 A number of English and German firsthand accounts mention Marlborough Meetinghouse, but the Meeting was not officially created until 1799, well after the battle. Project research suggests that an infomally defined Marlborough Meeting (and not a specific meetinghouse
The Army Marched at Dawn

Plan  Chapter 3 – Battlefield Analysis

Formation of Crown Forces into Two Columns – “The Army March’d at Day Break in Two Columns”

Gen’l Washington was uncertain whether Gen’l Howe would employ his past used flanking maneuver at this battle also, and throughout the day on September 11 received conflicting reports of the Crown Forces location, which did not help Gen’l Washington to firmly ascertain Gen’l Howe’s intent. What Gen’l Washington did not know was that three local loyalists, well familiar with the countryside, were leading Crown Force troops north from near modern Kennett Square Borough through a confusing network of winding roads formed by the natural landscape to cross Brandywine Creek at two unguarded fords far out of the way of where Gen’l Washington and his advisors expected Crown Forces to cross. What is also known is that Gen’l Howe ordered the Eastern Column to make a deliberate appearance as being the entire British Army coming from the west directly at the Americans near modern Chadds Ford.

Crown Forces Northern Column: Gen’l Cornwallis’ Division

This analysis examines the first stage of the Crown Forces Northern Column route, Gen’l Cornwallis’ Division, as it moved from its overnight encampment in/near Kennett Square and headed north under Gen’l Howe’s tactical flank. The intent of the movement was to endeavor to circumvent and outmaneuver Gen’l Washington and the American Forces main position near Chad’s Ford in its defense against the 1777 British campaign to capture Philadelphia. This column consisted of around 9,000 troops. This project revises the Northern Column route to a Unionville Rd.-East Doe Run Rd.-Northbrook Rd. movement, providing an alteration and correction to the previously assumed route depicted in the 2010 Study and 2013 Plan.

Column Formation & March Begins – Union St/Unionville Rd./Rt. 82

On the morning of September 11, Gen’l Cornwallis’ Division was in column formation along today’s Union St. This column began forming for its march about 4AM. It had bivouacked the previous evening along today’s Union St, extending from the vicinity of today’s Rt. 1 Bypass south through modern Kennett Square to the hill where the Kennett High School is located in the vicinity of today’s South St.

A distance of approximately ½-mile placed the front formation of Gen’l Cornwallis’ Division in the area of today’s Union Hill Cemetery, an elevation north of today’s Kennett Square Borough and south of today’s Rt. 1 Bypass interchange. The elevation has a local name of ‘Hessian Hill’. Two battle-era landowners in this area, Jesse Miller and Francis Way, reported property damages; however, there are no property damages reported immediately to the north in East Marlborough Township suggesting that either the general vicinity of the modern Rt. 1 Bypass was the limit of the overnight September 10/11 encampment or that the predominantly Quaker landowners of East Marlborough Township farms chose not to report any losses or damages.
Hessian jäger occupied the northern approach to the bivouac along modern Rt. 82, but they saw none of the enemy (Americans) save some light dragoons. Damages and sufferings reported by Henry Neal, Thomas Vernon, Francis Windle, and Caleb Johnson may be associated with the positions occupied by the jäger. The need for flank guards and patrols was constant and caused a certain level of anxiety among Crown Force Army soldiers. Maj. Johann Christian Du Buy of the Fusilier Regiment von Truembach wrote that “...we were always surrounded by [American forces]” and “we had to take precautions when encamping and marching, as the van-guard, side-patrols to the right and left and also the rear-guard were constantly encountering them...” (Du Buy 1777). Maj. Baurmeister reported that “the enemy patrols could advance further than ours because they were known and feared by the inhabitants, whereas ours risked being shot from ambush or cut off at every house, bush, woods, and fence – which happened more than once...” (Baurmeister 1935:403).

Unionville Rd.
On the morning of September 11, Union St./Unionville Rd. was the KOCOA avenue of approach for Gen’l Cornwallis’ flanking column of British and Hessian soldiers. Gen’l Howe’s Hessian aide de camp, Capt. Friedrich von Muenchhausen, recorded in his journal that “At five o’clock in the morning General Howe marched off to his left, up the Brandywine. Our column consisted of two battalions of English light infantry, two battalions of English grenadiers, two battalions of English Guards, two brigades of English infantry, two squadrons of dragoons, the Hessian jägers and the Hessian grenadiers. Since our column had no baggage, but did have a number of sappers in the van, we moved forward quickly in spite of the great heat” (Muenchhausen 1974:31). Capt. Johann Ewald of the Hessian Field Jäger Corps led this column, and he noted that “...The column on the left, under Lord Cornwallis, which General Howe personally accompanied, began marching to the left toward Jeffers’s Ford, where the Brandywine Creek has two branches which are very good for crossing, in order to outflank the fortified position of the enemy [along Brandywine Creek]” (Ewald 1979:81).

Capt. Ewald was the point man for the Northern Column’s flanking movement and he described the general character of the Brandywine Valley landscape that the Crown Force Army was moving through. Taking his role as the point guard for the Army, Ewald wrote that “I was ordered to march as slowly as possible, and to use all caution in order not to fall into an ambush, as the area was traversed by hills, woodlands, marshes, and the steepest defiles” (Ewald 1979:83). The landscape was a general topic of note for several of the Hessian and British officers, who commented on woods, hills, and unevenness of the ground (Anonymous 1777; Burgoyne 1987:48; Montresor 1881:416).

British and Hessian officers report encountering American Forces soon after they began the flanking march. Capt. Ewald noted that “...I led the advanced guard of the column under Lord Cornwallis, which consisted of sixty foot
jägers, Lieutenant Hagen with fifteen mounted jägers, a company of Highlanders from the 42nd Regiment under Captain McPherson, and a company of light infantry under Captain Scott, I had hardly marched half an hour when I ran into a warning post of the enemy, five to six hundred men strong, who withdrew from one favorable position to another under constant skirmishing until around noontime (Ewald 1979:83). To measure distance travelled, Capt. Ewald used a calculation of 3,300 feet per quarter hour (Ewald 1979:378, n25). Based on his estimate, the front of Gen’l Cornwallis’ Division would have advanced no more than 6,600 feet, or about 1.25 miles, before encountering American skirmishers. It is more likely that the column front travelled even less of a distance, since Capt. Ewald had been ordered to move slowly to avoid ambushes. If his estimate is correct, skirmishing with American Forces may have begun in the vicinity of where Unionville Rd. intersects Street Rd.

Contemporary sources elaborate further on this skirmishing with American Forces, but the number of Americans reported was considerably lower than what was reported by Capt. Ewald. The Field Jäger Corps reported that: "...about two miles this side of the Brandywine we met an enemy patrol of one hundred men, which retreated into the woods, leaving a few prisoners behind. This force was the one which notified General [George] Washington of our approach and convinced him to change his belief, which up till now, was that our army really intended to cross at Chad’s Ford, and to detach the largest part of his army to oppose us...."(Burgoyne 1987:48).

A letter from Maj. Du Buy echoes the Field Jäger Corps statement, writing that after a march of two “English miles” the advanced guard under Capt. Ewald “…came across a body of the enemy consisting of about 100 men, who, however, retired speedily…” (Du Buy 1777). Capt. Muenchhausen is the only source to call out that American mounted troops were encountered on the march, writing that "at noon our vanguard came upon 200 rebel dragoons, who wounded some of our men by their fire, but they soon retreated" (Muenchhausen 1974:31). He is almost certainly referring to American Col. Bland’s dragoons.

Unionville Rd. today substantially follows the road trace of its 18th-century ancestor, the 1720 Road. Some road changes have occurred near its intersection with Street Rd. In general, the landscape along Unionville Rd. north of today’s Kennett Square Borough is suburban with residences, schools, and businesses present. However, west of the road, which witnessed the events of September 11 through at least one civilian encounter recorded via a depredation claim, the setting remains intact displaying areas of battle-era landscape.

**East Doe Run Rd.**

Gen’l Cornwallis’ Division turned southeast when it reached Doe Run Rd., which was in place at least by 1774 when it was resurveyed. The division marched on this road for approximately 2 miles. The road alignment today is little changed from its 18th-century appearance, and is substantially the roadbed that was present at the time of the battle. The landscape along portions of the road have also remained more rural in character in pockets providing a feel of the battle-era setting.

**High Ground at Northbrook/ East Doe Run/ East Street Rds. Intersection**

At an elevation of 462 feet, this high ground is located near today’s East Doe Run Rd., Northbrook Rd., and East Street Rd./Rt. 926 intersection. It is a prominent KOCOA observation point that was identified as a result of this project. From this location, American Forces could observe and survey lands to the west and south along a possible principal approach route to the Brandywine Creek main stem to the east as well as to Brandywine Creek west branch to the north. American troops posted on this rise would have been able to observe enemy movements along East Street Rd. and East Doe Run Rd.

American formations were attempting to cover the various KOCOA avenues of approach to the battle. It is likely that small groups of light troops and dragoons were deployed...
along principal west-to-east roads leading from the general Kennett Square vicinity towards Brandywine Creek, such as the modern Baltimore Pike corridor and the roughly parallel Street Rd. American patrols were also stationed along the 1728 Road to the Great Valley. (The 1728 Road crossed Trimble’s Ford and had a road spur of the 1728 Road that led to battle-era Martin’s Tavern in Marshallton village).

It is hypothesized herein that elements of Brig. Gen’l Maxwell’s Light Infantry Corps under the command of Lt. Col. James Ross were posted on this high ground. The location is about 1-mile north of Welch’s Tavern, another of the advanced posts for American light infantry. The movement of Gen’l Cornwallis’ flanking column was known and contested by skirmishers soon after the column began its march from Kennett Square. The march along East Doe Run Rd. would have led directly to the high ground near the East Doe Run/Street Rds. intersection. The northern turn that Gen’l Cornwallis’ column took onto Northbrook/Red Lion Rds. would certainly have raised concerns on the part of the Americans, and it is likely that American Lt. Col. Ross’ message back to Gen’l Washington was due to the change in course of the Northern Column onto the 1728 Road to the Great Valley that led directly to Trimble’s Ford crossing of Brandywine Creek’s west branch.

**Northbrook Rd./Red Lion Rd.**
Gen’l Cornwallis’ Division turned nearly due north when it reached today’s Northbrook Rd. Northbrook Rd. and its northern extension, Red Lion Rd., were laid out in 1728 as a ‘Road to the Great Valley’. The march route followed Northbrook Rd and then moved onto Red Lion Rd. north of modern Unionville-Lenape Rd. (Northbrook Rd. intersects with and becomes Red Lion Rd. at this point). The Trimble’s and Jefferis’ Fords Strategic Landscape Plan area picks near this intersection/at the southern border of modern Pocopson Township, with Crown Forces marching north on the 1728 Road to the Great Valley. The Trimble’s and Jefferis’ Fords Strategic Landscape Plan describes that the Northern Column followed Northbrook/Red Lion Rds. northward for about 2.5 miles, to today’s intersection with modern Unionville-Wawaset Rd./Rt. 842, a road that did not exist in 1777. Battle-era Northbrook/Red Lion Rds. then continued north to follow its 18th-century roadbed, now a road trace. The setting and landscape surrounding both roads are evocative of the rural character of the Brandywine Valley region. Both roads remain narrow and are deeply incised in some locations and have no shoulders. Both roads and their surrounds still evoke a battle-era setting.

**Corrine Rd.**
Corrine Rd., laid out in 1742, is hypothesized to be the location where a 70-man patrol party from Lt. Col. James Ross’ light infantry detachment engaged the Northern Column’s rear. Corrine Rd. is located about 5,000 feet north from Lenape-Unionville Rd. While this part of the Northern Column route falls within the northern battlefield, and as such, is a subject of Trimble’s and Jefferis’ Fords Strategic Landscapes Plan, during southern battlefield study clarifications were found regarding these battle activities and thus this section provides a refinement to the Trimble’s and Jefferis’ Fords Plan findings.

American Forces arrayed west of Brandywine Creek consisted of detachments from Brig. Gen’l Maxwell’s Light Infantry Corps comprising Continental soldiers and Pennsylvania militia, as well as patrols of Continental light dragoons under the command of Col. Theodorick Bland (cf., DeHaven 1832). Brig. Gen’l Maxwell’s light troops were intended to serve as a reconnaissance force to slow enemy movements and provide information about enemy formations and maneuvers. Troops in Brig. Gen’l Maxwell’s Light Corps were drawn from Continental regiments and battalions (a term used interchangeably during the Revolutionary War) within the American Army, including regiments from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Virginia, and North Carolina. In addition to the Continentals, the American Light Infantry Corps included a large proportion of riflemen, many of whom were volunteers from county militias of Lancaster, York, North Hampton, and Cumberland in PA. These Pennsylvania militia company

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1 More information is found in Behind the Lines and Breaching the Fords & the British Advance Strategic Landscapes Plans.
2 There were other roads to the Great Valley as well as during this era roads, if they had names which most did not, were named for their destinations; as destinations changed, so did road names. This complicated battle analysis is completed for the northern battlefield, however through that analysis it was determined that the Northbrook Rd./Red Lion Rd. was the Road to the Great Valley used for the route of march.
volunteers were attached to the Light Corps specifically because they were armed with rifles. To further supplement the Light Corps, Gen’l Washington also ordered a volunteer battalion of Chester County militia to join Brig. Gen’l Maxwell on September 1 (Catts 2014). This unit, the 8th Battalion Chester County Militia commanded by Patterson Bell, was ordered to join with Brig. Gen’l Maxwell’s light troops on September 1, but it is possible that Bell’s troops did not actually organize until September 6 (Smith 1976:9).

About a week earlier, on September 2, Gen’l Washington had provided guidance to Brig. Gen’l Maxwell regarding the role of his Light Corps, and this advice can be applied to the method of patrolling used by the Light Troops on the morning of September 11. Gen’l Washington advised Brig. Gen’l Maxwell to “keep small parties upon every Road that you may be sure of the one they take.”

American Lt. Col. Ross’ light infantry detachment, like those Capts. Porterfield, Scott, Chambers, and Armstrong that Lt. Col. Heth, and Maj. Simms described, was likely positioned south of Brandywine Creek West Branch, patrolling roads, as were other light detachments. It is hypothesized that Lt. Col. Ross observed the movements of Gen’l Cornwallis’ column from the high point at East Doe Run/Street Rds. and his Lt. Col. Ross’ patrol then followed the rear of the Crown Force Northern Column before engaging them in a skirmish for a short time near Corrine Rd. At 11am, Lt. Col. Ross – identifying his position as on the “Great Valley Road” and listing his unit affiliation as “D.P.R.” or Dunlap’s Partisan Regiment, elements of which were attached to Brig. Gen’l Maxwell’s Light Corps – penned a message to Gen’l Washington.

Lt. Col. Ross’ note can be read as a warning to Gen’l Washington that the road Gen’l Cornwallis’ Northern Column was following – identified as the Great Valley Road (also termed “Road to the Great Valley” per Chester County Archives researchers) – presented multiple avenues of approach to the American position. Lt. Col. Ross note indicates that from this road Gen’l Cornwallis’ column could reach 1) Jefferis’ Ford\(^1\), 2) Taylor’s Ford, 3) go further north into the Great Valley and strike the Lancaster Road at the Sign of the Ship Tavern, or 4) head southeast towards Dilworth village\(^2\). The rear of the Northern Column came under fire from a portion of Lt. Col. Ross’ command, but was not seriously impeded. Lt. Col. Ross’ detachment seems to have hung on to the rear of the Crown Forces column until after the battle, when he Lt. Col. Ross is reported in East Bradford Township at night fall (McGuire 2006:264).

### Crown Forces Eastern Column: Gen’l Knyphausen’s Division

This analysis examines the Crown Forces route of Gen’l Knyphausen’s Division, the Eastern Column, as it moved from its overnight bivouacs outside of Kennett Square east to Chad’s Ford. The intent of the movement was to convince the Americans that the main thrust of Gen’l Howe’s attack would be centered at Gen’l Washington and the American Forces’ main position near Chad’s Ford in defense against the 1777 British campaign to capture Philadelphia. This column consisted of 6,800 troops.

### Column Formations & March Begins – Baltimore Pike/Rt. 1

The Great Nottingham Road, sometimes referred to by contemporaries as the Chester Road, The Post Road, or the Baltimore Pike, was the direct route to Chad’s Ford and Brandywine Creek. The road was established as early as 1743 and extended from Chad’s Ford in a westerly direction, passing Old Kennett Meetinghouse, Welch’s

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1 This route is the one taken by the northern column as discussed in the Trimble’s and Jefferis’ Fords Strategic Landscapes Plan.
2 This route is the one the Northern Column ultimately used to attack Gen’l Washington’s troops from his side, as will be discussed in future Phase 3 strategic landscapes planning.
The Great Nottingham Road was the principal KOCA avenue of approach for Gen’l Knyphausen’s column as it moved towards the American position along Brandywine Creek on the morning of September 11. At about 4AM on that morning, Gen’l Knyphausen’s column formed with its lead formations standing at today’s School House Rd./Baltimore Pike intersection, about 1.3 miles east from the center of Kennett Square. The column consisted of “…Captain Ferguson’s British Riflemen, one battalion of Queen’s Rangers, the 71st (Highland) Regiment, which consisted of three battalions, the 1st and 2nd English brigades under General Grant, Stirn’s brigade (i.e., the Lieb Regiment, Donop’s, Mirbach’s, and the Combined Battalion), the other half of the 16th Regiment of [Light] Dragoons, two brigades of heavy artillery, the entire artillery and provision train, the baggage, and the cattle” (Baurmeister 1935:404). The unpublished Erbprinz Regimental journal noted that “…the 2nd Battalion of the 71st Regiment…formed the rear guard while the 1st and 3rd Battalion of the regiment covered the right and left flank” (Erbprinz 1777). The advance guard of the column consisted of British Capt. Patrick Ferguson’s 90-man company of riflemen, 15 mounted dragoons, and the Queen’s Rangers, a Loyalist unit commanded by Capt. James Weyms and numbering perhaps 398 men (Harris 2014:223; McGuire 2006:175; Smith 1976:29). This advance guard would bear the brunt of the skirmishing and the casualties in the early morning hours as the column approached the Creek.

**Four Skirmishes & a "Running" Battle**

As Gen’l Knyphausen’s troops neared today’s Baltimore Pike entrance to Longwood Gardens, they were met by resistance from American light infantry under the command of Brig. Gen’l William Maxwell. His Light Infantry was the advanced guard for American defenses. They fought a series of short delaying actions, dropping back each time towards the Creek. Identification through the documentary evidence of skirmishes at these four locations, as well as skirmishes in Approach and Encampment Landscapes and Northern Columns Landscape (and along White Clay Creek and near Milltown in New Castle County) are significant insights into the battle found through this project. This project reviewed American pension filings, to supplement already known sources, providing insightful and more detail about American Force movements on the west side of Brandywine Creek on September 10-11, and indicating that American Forces (light infantry, local militia units, and dragoon detachments) were quite active west of the Creek in the days before the battle, continually hovering on the Crown Force Army as they moved through the area.
**Welch’s Tavern Site Skirmish**

Welch’s Tavern, or Anvil Tavern, was located about 700 feet east of modern Longwood Gardens’ entrance (Harris 2014:223). The location today is marked by a small stone with an anvil. Tavern foundation walls still exist in the garden walls of a later nearby home on Longwood Gardens’ grounds. By the early 20th century, the tavern was a two-story stone building.

At 6am, two hours after Gen’l Knyphausen’s column began its advance, the first shots of the battle were fired from a wooded area located across the Great Nottingham Road to the east of the tavern. American Light Infantry commanded by Brig. Gen’l William Maxwell had an advanced position at Welch’s Tavern. Hessian Maj. Gen’l Johann Daniel Stirn wrote, “the column under the command of General von Kyphausen marched via Welch’s Tavern where the Rebels had an outpost” (Stirn 1998:6). This first American position was held by a detachment of approximately 150 men commanded by Capt. Charles Porterfield of the 11th Virginia Regiment (McGuire 2006:175). Capt. Porterfield’s men had likely been posted at the tavern since some time on September 10; a Hessian report commented that the English riflemen encountered American riflemen “…in the wood on the other side of the tavern where they [the Americans] had spent the night” (Letter Z 1777).

For both armies, Welch’s Tavern functioned as a significant landmark not only on September 11, but also in the days leading up to the battle. Several British and Hessian accounts indicate that Welch’s Tavern was well-known to them as early as September 9 as they approached Kennett Square. Capt. Muenchhausen wrote in his journal that we “…were instructed to inform General Knyphausen that he should march early the next morning towards Kennett Square with the greatest precaution, because Washington’s foreposts were already at Welch’s Tavern, two miles from Kennett Square” (Muenchhausen 1974:30). Baumeister, in his report for September 9, notes that Gen’l Howe anticipated the two columns, Gen’l Cornwallis’ and Gen’l Knyphausen’s, would reunite east of Kennett Square, at Welch’s Tavern. Gen’l Howe, he wrote, “…gave such marching orders that both columns were to arrive at the place of rendezvous, namely Welch’s Tavern, at the same time” (Baurmeister 1935:403).
On the American side, Col. Moses Hazen of Congress’s Own (or the Canadian) Regiment, posted at Jones Ford on Brandywine Creek, reported that on September 10 he had a detachment operating “about one mile from Welch’s Tavern and six miles from this place” seized 28 sheep and 17 head of cattle “from the Enemy” (Hazen 1889:161). Hazen also reported that the livestock were taken by Capt. Alexander Patterson of Northampton County and Capt. Stephen Chambers of Northumberland County; both of the 12th Pennsylvania Regiment. Recruited from PA’s western counties, the members of the 12th Pennsylvania were largely rifle-armed, and the unit was often called upon to serve in scouting (Trussell 1977:134-136). It is likely that Capts. Patterson and Chambers commanded detachments that were assigned to Brig. Gen’l Maxwell’s Light Infantry Corps and were active in reconnoitering west of the Creek.

Another member of the American Light Corps, PA militiaman Andrew Cummings, identified Welch’s Tavern as a landmark in his pension application. Attached to Col. Dunlap’s Partisan Regiment, Cummings related that “…the evening before the battle of Brandywine, the company to which the applicant belonged [under the command of Captain John Scott] were ordered to take position, about half way between Welch’s tavern and Chad’s Ford and the Brandywine about four miles apart, where we stood on picket guard that night, and were ordered to fire on the British flankers as they passed next morning and then to retreat across the Creek, this we did, and then were sent about a quarter of a mile above Chad’s Ford to guard a pass where the creek could be forded, there we remained until the battle was over…..” (Cummings 1832). In the time leading up to the engagement, Cumming’s company, like other American units positioned west of the Creek, was “employed some time in scouting through the Country and between the lines of the British and American forces” (Cummings 1832). American Light Infantryman Jesse Nicholson of the 15th Virginia Regiment recalled that they “hovered upon the lines of the Enemy” (Nicholson 1832). These units ensured that Crown Forces movements would be contested.

On the morning of September 11, Gen’l Knyphausen reported that he had barely reached Welch’s Tavern with the advance guard of his column when they came under fire from the woods east of the Tavern (McGuire 2006:175). American Capt. Porterfield’s company fired into British Capt. Ferguson’s riflemen and dragoons. Capt. Porterfield himself reportedly killed “the first men…who fell that day” (Heth 1931:33). Capt. Ferguson wrote that “the first party we had to do with was an advanced Post of 150 men and some light horse, who threw away their fire and ran off, with the loss of three or four men and a horse whom we shot flying” (Harris 2014:224). Crown Force Sgt. Stephen Jarvis of the Queen’s Rangers commented that “The first discharge of the discharge of the enemy killed the horse of Major [sic] Grymes, who was leading the column, and wounded two men in the Division directly in my front, and in a few moments the Regiment became warmly engaged and several of our officers were badly wounded” (Jarvis 1907:449).

Virginian American Light Infantryman Jesse Nicholson recollected in his pension that “…at Brandywine it was our lot to bring on the Battle” (Nicholson 1832). Capt. Porterfield’s orders were to “deliver his fire as soon as he should meet the van of the enemy, and then to fall back” (Lee 1998:89). After the initial firing and inflicting casualties, Capt. Porterfield’s detachment withdrew, having no intention of bringing on an engagement. They retreated east along the Great Nottingham Road towards the next already-manned defensive position. The location east of modern Baltimore Pike where this encounter took place has been altered by road widening and other 20th century ground disturbance. The high ground in this area today is approximately at 460 feet elevation.
Hamorton village Skirmish

The road forked at this second defensive location, with the Great Nottingham Road intersecting the Doe Run-Wilmington Road (modern Rt. 52/Kennett Pike) from the south. Lt. Col. Heth’s men occupied an elevation (approximately 470 feet) on the north side of the road. This position is west of where modern Rt. 52 intersects Baltimore Pike in Hamorton village (Harris 2014:226). When Gen’l Knyphausen’s advance guard came within range, Lt. Col. Heth’s men fired a volley, then again withdrew to the east. Today’s Hamorton village has altered this location somewhat. While the village topography is relatively unchanged, the elevation north of the road is currently occupied by residences.

Old Kennett Meetinghouse Skirmish
The combined detachments of Capt. Porterfield and Lt. Col. Heth withdrew approximately 1,000 feet to the southeast, taking up a third defensive position on a wooded and elevated piece of ground across from the Old Kennett Meetinghouse (Harris 2014:226). The Great Nottingham Road descends from Hamorton village as it continues to the east. Modern Baltimore Pike/Rt. 1 has smoothed this descent by raising the roadbed and cutting the hill, so the elevation of the Old Kennett Meetinghouse is not as apparent as it would have been in 1777. The original roadbed of The Great Nottingham Road passed to both sides of the Old Kennett Meetinghouse at that time of the battle, while the road bed of modern Baltimore Pike passes just to the south of the Meetinghouse. It is thought locally that American Forces used the stone wall, which remains intact, to the Meetinghouse’s west to aid in cover and concealment from approaching Crown Force Eastern Column.

The American light infantry discharged one volley from this position, inflicting casualties on the Queen’s Rangers. While American troops were forming deliberate defensive lines as they withdrew towards Brandywine Creek, the appearance of the fighting to a contemporary British soldier was of a “running fire, mixed with regular vollies [sic]” (Sullivan 1997:130).

Unnamed Wooded Hill & Fencing East of Old Kennett Meetinghouse Skirmish
Capt. Porterfield and Lt. Col. Heth combined detachments withdrew again, descending to a small creek valley along The Great Nottingham Road and then climbing to a rise about 2,300 feet east of Old Kennett Meetinghouse. On the north side of the road, a small round elevation of approximately 430 feet is situated at that location. The fourth defensive American position is likely situated in this vicinity. At this locale, the Porterfield-Heth detachments joined another American Light Infantry detachment commanded by Virginian Maj. Charles Simms of the 12th Virginia Regiment. Maj. Simms troops were under good cover on the elevation, and the withdrawing Americans took up a position behind a fence, but near Maj. Simms detachments concealed position (Harris 2014:228; Smith 1976:10).
The Crown Forces advance guard came forward along the Great Nottingham Road, “rapidly and incautiously, until it lined the front of the detachment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Simms, who poured in a close and destructive fire” (Lee 1998:89). Crown Force Sgt. Thomas Sullivan of the 49th Regiment of Foot described this same encounter, writing that “The Queen’s Rangers and Rifle [sic] Corps…advancing to the foot of a hill, saw the Enemy formed behind the fence [Porterfield’s detachment], were deceived by the Rebel’s telling them, that they would deliver up their Arms, but upon their advancing they fired a volley upon our men…” (Sullivan 1997:130). The American volley was effective, as about 30 men of the Queen’s Rangers and Riflemen were killed or wounded. After this fire, the American light infantry withdrew once again, heading east towards the Creek.

The Battle Moves East

This series of four short, but sharp, skirmishes or clashes served to slow Knyphausen’s advance towards Chad’s Ford. Each action caused the Crown Force leading formations to deploy, engage, chase the retreating Americans, then reorganize before moving forward. By the time the fourth American position had been overcome, Ferguson’s Riflemen and the Queen’s Rangers were tired and disorganized. They had taken relatively heavy casualties, particularly among officers (Heth 1931:33; Sullivan 1997:130; Lee 1998:89).

Gen’l Knyphausen’s advance to Chad’s Ford became more cautious after these encounters. As he moved closer to Chad’s Ford, his movement was further hampered by obstructions that the Americans had placed along the Great Nottingham Road. PA soldier Alexander Beggs recalled in his pension application that “he and some others were sent in the morning before the battle [September 10], to fell trees in the road for the purpose of obstructing the march of the enemy” (Beggs 1832). Beggs’ timbering was effective. Crown Force Capt. Francis Downman of the Royal Artillery wrote that “…we galloped our horses some time, but were prevented from continuing the [Great Nottingham] road by reason of trees being cut down and laid across” (Downman 1898:157). The obstructions in the Great Nottingham Road likely forced Gen’l Knyphausen to decide to shift the Baggage and Supply Train to the south and then east instead.

Crown Forces Baggage & Supply Wagon Train

A ‘baggage train’ or a caravan of supply wagons and camp followers/troop support personnel provides a very important element of wars and battles, for without adequate supplies undertaking military activity is proportionally more difficult, if not impossible. On September 6, there were 270 supplies wagons, and Crown Force Maj. Bauermeyer reports that two days later the provision train consisted of 276 wagons “…loaded with rum, flour, and salt meat” (Bauermeyer 1935:402). However, Gen’l Howe had not brought enough wagons with him from New York. Compared to 1776, in June 1777 Gen’l Howe had reduced the number of wagons per company to two and doubled the number of horses to four, probably due to the state of roads Middle Atlantic region colonies. Property damage claims (depredation claims, plunder reports. Quaker sufferings) reveal that Crown Forces were constantly supplementing supplies through commandeering or confiscating wagons, carts, food, and other supplies to support the continued movement of the Army.

1 Battle activity further to the east will be covered in future Phase 3 planning.
The Baggage and Supply Train in effect formed its own ‘column’, at first following the Eastern Column and then moving south along today’s Hillendale and Fairville Rds., passing farms in Pennsbury Township. The area of these two road corridors retains integrity in setting and location and forms an intact context for this portion of the southern battlefield, where Gen’l. Knyphausen successfully pushed back American Forces, and then, further east of this Landscape\(^1\), deployed troops along Brandywine Creek’s western bank, holding Gen’l. Washington’s attention long enough to allow the Northern Column’s flanking maneuver to be completed.

While the exact number of wagons per British and Hessian regiment in early September 1777 is unknown, it likely was at least two. Based on the number of British and Hessian units in the Crown Force Army and including the 276 wagons loaded with supplies - a week’s worth of supplies accompanied troops via a wagon train - plus wagons loaded with equipment, the treasury, etc., a minimum of 350 wagons drawn by around 1,400 horses seems a reasonable estimate of the total size of the Baggage and Supply Train. If all the wagons for the Crown Force Army (including for both Columns) were lined up along the same road in-tow one after the other, the Baggage and Supply Train would have been between 2.5 and 3 miles in length, not counting artillery pieces and 15,800 troops marching in both columns. At night and over difficult roads, the Baggage and Supply Train could have spread considerably longer and even lose contact with the troops.

When Gen’l Knyphausen’s Eastern Column started its march toward the Americans along Brandywine Creek’s main stem, it contained “the entire artillery and provision train, the baggage, and the cattle” (Baurmeister 1935:404). Period maps depicting the Column show the baggage wagons flanked by the three battalions of the 71st Regiment. Attributed to Hessian artillerist Friedrich W. Werner and engineer Reinhard J. Martin, it is likely that these map depictions of the baggage train are stylized, since baggage and livestock would have occupied considerably more ground than shown on the maps. The important point here, however, is that the Baggage and Supply Train was moving at the rear of the Eastern Column. Attaching the baggage to the Column reinforced the intended deception of the complete Crown Force Army moving towards modern Chadds Ford, and would have been so reported to American Forces east of the Creek. The three battalions of the 71st Regiment totaled about 1,200 men (Harris 2014:193). While one of these battalions took part in the fighting west of the Creek in the morning of September 11, the other two battalions remained as baggage train guards.

**Hillendale/Fairville Rds.**

The intentionally felled timber by American Forces to block the Great Nottingham Road in an attempt to slow Crown Forces advancement east, mentioned by both Americans and British accounts, likely served as the catalyst for Gen’l Knyphausen moving the Baggage and Supply Train off the Great Nottingham Road. Importantly, this project rediscovered the route of the Baggage and Supply Train and its supporting three-battalion guard principally through researching property damage claims from Pennsbury Township residents. The above mentioned period maps show the Baggage and Supply Train along the Great Nottingham Road, but do not show its movement(s). Given its length and difficulty the artillery had in moving on the Great Nottingham Road due to the felled trees, it appears that the Baggage Train was shifted south to the Hillendale/Fairville Rds. corridor. This shift probably occurred when the Baggage Train reached the intersection of the Great Nottingham Road and the 1759 Road to Wilmington (modern Kennett Pike). The intersection of the 1759 Road to Wilmington and the 1754 Brandywine Road (modern Hillendale Rd.) is situated about 1 ¼-miles southeast of Hamorton village. An alternative approach to reach Hillendale/Fairville Rds. would have been to turn off the Great Nottingham Road about 1-mile further east onto Hickory Hill Rd. Damage claims exist for a number of properties along the corridor. Family farms of Isaac, Thomas, Joseph, and Noah Mendenhall along Hillendale/Fairville Rds. reported considerable damage, as did Peter Harvey (tenant of William Harvey, Jr.), and Caleb and Moses Mendenhall along modern Stabler Rd. just west of the Creek.

The Crown Forces Baggage and Supply Train remained west of Brandywine Creek throughout the day on September 11. It did not cross to the Creek’s east side until late afternoon/evening of September 12. The Baggage

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\(^1\) Areas east of this Landscape will be studies during a future Phase 3 strategic landscapes planning project.
Train therefore sat along Hillendale/Fairville Rds. for more than 24-hours, meaning the wagons, livestock, wagoners, wagon guards, and others (animals, people, and equipment) attached to the Baggage Train had ample time to damage property, take household items including furniture, tableware, books, clothing, personal items, and commandeered wagons and livestock.

**Historic Military Archeological Potential**

Based on the battle and landscape analysis, historic archeological potential related to battle military events in southern battlefield Landscapes was assessed. Archeological potential varies according to what types of archeological remains are being considered. For example, archeological character for a marching movement is different than a skirmish or a formal battle combat situation.

Fields of conflict are temporary, albeit seminal, events, superimposed on preexisting cultural landscapes. These Landscapes witnessed a variety of cultural actions - transportation systems, agricultural development, settlement patterns, population change – that exerted influence on the land prior to the engagement on September 11, 1777 and that continue to exert influences on the field after the battle through today. Land uses, such as pasture and field patterns, farmsteads, and husbandry buildings, change as they give way to ultimate progression; roads are altered, vacated, rerouted, or widened, woodlands are reduced or removed from the landscape, and structures are expanded, modified, or razed. Despite these transformations, the archeological evidence of conflict is often quite resilient and can be discovered through archeological investigation.

Given the extensive land coverage of the Brandywine Battlefield, burial sites are possible, and have been found, in a number of locations on the battlefield. Battlefield burials are known to be present at Old Kennett Meetinghouse (as well as Birmingham Meetinghouse and "at a few smaller grave sites scattered in or near the battlefield" (Webster et al. 1989:50). A small commemorative stone erected to the memory of Hessian soldiers is found in the burial ground of the Old Kennett Meetinghouse. The discovery of human remains has been reported at seemingly random locations around the battlefield and is a consideration for these Landscapes, particularly around skirmish sites, but also in other possible locations as heat stroke, related to the warm, humid September weather and woolen clothes and heavy packs, and other calamities may have struck troops within the area.

**Northern Column & Eastern Column Landscapes**

Principal types of potential archeological remains that may be expected to be present in these Landscapes are: 1) Northern and Eastern Columns built features (road traces, building foundations, 2) Northern and Eastern Column’s skirmishing sites, and 3) parked Baggage and Supply Train artifacts.

**Northern & Eastern Columns Landscape**

The potential for archeological evidence of battle-related military activities with both columns Landscapes is considered to be generally low for the troop march and movements of both columns. The principal military action that occurred on September 11 within the Landscapes was the movement of approximately 15,800 men, plus artillery, horses, and baggage wagons through the Chester County countryside. Such a movement, while extremely impressive to witness, was likely fairly ephemeral in regard to the physical evidence (e.g., military artifacts) that it would leave as an archeological ‘footprint’. Crown Forces formations did slow and halt/rest while waiting to traverse the Chester County countryside, but such actions were of short duration and would leave comparatively small archeological signatures.

The **Northern Column Landscape** contains pockets of rural lands and period buildings that is evocative of the battle-era setting. Along Street Rd. Wollaston Rd., Mill Rd., and where East Doe Run Rd. meets Northbrook/Red Lion Rd. (the 1728 Road to the Great Valley), the Landscape is more rural including several important historic
structures. East Marlborough at the time of the battle had almost entirely Quaker-owned land, and the war effort found little support in this area, particularly for the American side. The actual route and roads that troops followed is remarkably intact and clearly visible today. East Doe Run Rd. and Northbrook/Red Lion Rds. portions of the Landscape illustrate exactly how/where Gen’l Cornwallis was able to successfully outflank the American Army, maneuvering approximately 9,000 troops on a long circuitous march through difficult terrain.

The Eastern Column Landscape has been altered since 1777, however, contains pockets of rural lands that convey the battle-era setting, particularly those areas well south of today’s Baltimore Pike corridor. Today’s Baltimore Pike/Rt. 1 (the colonial Great Nottingham Road) going east toward Brandywine Creek has been significantly widened and the actual roadbed replaced a number of times, but portions of the colonial road are still present outside of the modern right-of-way and the road itself still passes by the preserved colonial-era historic structures that were directly and indirectly related to the battle. For example, the Landscape contains historic and archeological resources of the preserved Abraham Taylor farmhouse at Miller’s Hill that was plundered, archeological remains of Welch’s Tavern, and the preserved Old Kennett Meetinghouse where the first skirmish of the battle took place. In Pennsbury Township, the Pierce family property was damaged by advancing Crown Forces, two colonial structures attributed to Dr. Joseph Pierce were plundered, and James Brinton’s (who held property on both sides of the Great Nottingham Road) son made a plunder claim. What is remarkable about the Landscape is the fact that skirmishes between the eastern advancing Crown Force troops and the American Light Infantry can still be clearly traced in today’s setting in relationship to colonial properties. The route of the Eastern Column retains diminished archeological material integrity within the road corridor, however, locations of the four skirmishes are still apparent.

Skirmishing Sites
Locations of skirmishing that occurred at four locations along Gen’l Knyphausen’s Eastern Column approach to the Creek and at two locations1 along Gen’l Cornwallis’ Northern Column Flank march retain moderate potential for archeology. These fire-fights were quick musket and rifle discharges followed by withdrawal by American troops. First-person accounts indicate that skirmishing began soon after both columns started their respective movements. These actions would have generated primarily dropped and fired lead balls (musket and rifle balls) and may exhibit an archeological signature in the location where the skirmishing was most intense – Welch’s Tavern, Hamorton village, Old Kennett Meetinghouse, and the unnamed wooded hill/fencing east of Old Kennett Meetinghouse. Potential for skirmish-related artifacts along the Northern Column route is likely lower than for the Eastern Column for the simple reason that there was more engagement for longer period of time on the route of the Eastern Column compared to what took place on the route of the Northern Column. On a comparative basis with the main formal battle combat that occurred later in the day in the Eastern Battlefield, which will be examined in future Phase 3 strategic landscapes planning, the number and density of military-related artifacts in both columns Landscapes would be lower, but not without potential.

Baggage & Supply Train
The route of the Baggage and Supply Train along Hillendale/Fairville Rds. passes through farms of Pennsbury Township, and retains integrity of setting and location displaying a readable battle-era backdrop. Since the setting remains intact and the Baggage and Supply Train wagons were stopped in place for a period of time, as well as the locale was not far from major combat areas, the area retains moderate potential for historic and battle-related archeology.

From an archeological perspective while the movement of the both columns had short-term impact, it did have significant impact on the immediate physical surrounds and on the local community for many years after the battle in the form of damaged property as recorded by civilians through Depredation Claims, Plunder Reports, and Sufferings (Chapter 4).

1 See Trimble’s and Jefferis’ Fords Strategic Landscapes Plan for archeological potential for the rest of the Northern Column flanking march.
Associated Approach & Encampment Landscapes

Principal types of potential archeological evidence that may be found in these Landscapes are: 1) Approach skirmishing sites, and 2) Approach and Encampment built features (road traces, building foundations).

Approach Landscape - Potential for archeological evidence of military activities is generally low for both overall division’s march and movement. Short-term encampments occurred along the route at Rt. 7/Nichol’s House, Hockessin Meetinghouse, and in the Red Clay Valley. Skirmishes at Mill Creek Rd. (September 8) and New Garden Friends Meetinghouse (September 10) retain moderate potential for archeology. These fire-fights were quick musket and rifle discharges followed by American withdrawal. These actions would have primarily generated dropped and fired lead balls (musket and rifle balls) and may exhibit an archeological signature in skirmishing locations. The degree of development in the vicinity of Mill Creek Rd. makes this location less likely to contain significant archeological resources, however the New Garden Meetinghouse vicinity still retains a rural setting, raising the level of archeological potential.

Once in PA, Gen’l Cornwallis’ column may have recognized portions of the setting that is there today. This area remains fairly rural in character and the terrain/topography and Red Clay Creek and Valley are still evident. Considerable damage claims were filed by Kennett Township residents, and colonial-era structures remaining from those battle-era properties are viewable today. This area has remained fairly rural in character and due to this, there is moderate-high archeological potential. Interestingly, there were very few battle-era roads in southern Kennett Township, so transport must have relied on farm lands and by-roads.

The actual route and roads that Gen’l Knyphausen’s column traveled is evident today to the extent that project consultants, reading from a Hessian journal account, could literally follow in the Hessian soldier’s footsteps using distance conversions (battle-era perches to modern day miles) and extent historic built features of roads and structures. The route from historic/modern Limestone Rd., along historic/modern Gap-Newport Pike, and then either north on historic/modern Newark Rd. or continuing west to Avondale and turning east onto Baltimore Pike illustrate exactly how/where Gen’l Knyphausen’s column, including the Baggage and Supply Train as well as Crown Forces from Cornwallis’ column, was able to successfully and with relative speed arrive at Kennett Square. While much of this area contains development, there are still agricultural portions that evoke a battle-era setting that may contain archeological potential.

Encampment Landscape - On September 9-10, Gen’l Knyphausen’s column’s halted at a temporary location west of Kennett Square Borough, probably in the vicinity of modern Cedar Spring Rd., which was necessary to allow Gen’l Cornwallis’ column to arrive and then move through Kennett Square along modern Rt. 82. After waiting from about 10sm to noon on September 10 for Gen’l Cornwallis’ column to get into place, Gen’l Knyphausen’s column moved through Kennett Square on the Baltimore Pike to the high ground east of the village. On September 10-11, the Crown Forces encampment around Kennett Square was a temporary, short-term overnight camp. It was also a tactical position with advanced pickets and avenues of approach, and influenced by the limitations imposed by the local terrain. Contemporary descriptions note the overnight encampment was in two lines, “one behind the other” (Ewald 1979:81). One regimental scribe called the lines “uneven” suggesting that the regimental camp areas conformed to the local topography and conditions (Erbprinz 1777). An important clue as to the character of the two division camps is provided by Maj. Baurmeister, who commented that “…the army pitched a regular camp in two lines at Kennett Square” (Baurmeister 1935:403 – emphasis added). Maj. Baurmeister’s observation indicates that, while the camp lines were uneven, they followed standard military practice for overnight camps. As such, archeological distinctions may be possible to make regarding the camp layouts (known as ‘castrametation’) and the level of military standardization (Whitehorne 2006:29).
Though temporary and transient, overnight bivouacs and short-term camps are often distinguished by the presence of lost ammunition or discarded items. At Kennett Square, there were no tents or shelters, unless small temporary wood “bowers” were built by the men. Crown Force Army’s heavy baggage had been sent back to the Royal Navy at the Head of Elk when Gen’l Howe began his march into PA several days earlier. Fires were not allowed the night before battle, since the light of the fires would betray the position of the army. Food consumed in the camps would have been previously prepared and carried with the troops. Taking this into consideration, the archeological potential for the encampment is likely to be low to moderate. Physical evidence, such as regimental and/or plain buttons of various sizes, metal fixtures for polearms and flags, unfired lead shot, sword and scabbard parts, cannon balls, horse furniture (saddle or bridle parts, horseshoes), wagon furniture, and personal artifacts may be present, but the short period of time the camp was occupied likely limits the potential. With the exception of obviously military artifacts (marked regimental buttons, accoutrement plates, etc.), it will be difficult to distinguish other types of artifacts dating from the period of the camp from local civilian artifacts of the same period such as ceramics and glass.

The best evidence for where the encampment was situated comes from damage claims reported in Kennett Township. The camp did have a significant impact on the immediate physical surroundings in the form of damaged real estate and personal property. Locations of plundered properties clearly delineate the size of the encampment. Of the 33 landowners in the Township residing west of Red Clay Creek, 21 landowners (nearly 64%) reported plunderings by Crown Forces. Reported damages are especially heavy among the farms located along the McFarlan Rd. Corridor, extending south from the Great Nottingham Road. This corridor likely marks the overnight position of Gen’l Knyphausen’s column and extends as far south as the Gavin Hamilton Mill. Other property damage is centered along the Rt. 82 corridor, and likely relates to the overnight camp of Gen’l Cornwallis’ column.

**Recommendations**

Using the analysis undertaken in this chapter, the following recommendations were developed. Parties that may carry out a recommendation are noted in parentheses after the related recommendation.

3-1. Further verify the four skirmish locations between Gen’l Knyphausen’s Division and the American light infantry as they retreated from Welch’s Tavern and verify the Northern Column skirmish site as they turned to move north through archeological evaluation. Report any archaeological findings to PHMC for their recording in the inventory of important archaeological sites. (Military archeologist working with municipal historical commissions)

3-2. Consider archeological evaluation for the parked baggage and supply caravan area. Report any archaeological findings to PHMC for their recording in the inventory of important archaeological sites. (Military archeologist working with municipal historical commissions)

3-3. Gen’l Howe’s/Gen’l Comwallis’ Division’s route to cross Red Clay Creek West Branch towards Kennett Square is in the vicinity of modern Chandler Mill Rd. and to the north through the modern residential subdivision on Round Hill Rd. Archeological investigation should occur for confirmation. (Military archeologist working with municipal historical commissions)

3-4. Update 2013 Plan mapping to reflect the findings in this chapter. This includes the: probable location of the skirmishes along the Great Nottingham Road and the 1728 Road to the Great Valley, formation points of both columns, importance of the high ground centered around the (former) Red Lion Tavern, and the movement of the Baggage and Supply Train along Hillendale/Fairville Rd. Corridors. (CCPC)

3-5. Update 2010 KOCOA analysis and mapping to reflect the findings in this chapter. (CCPC)
3-6. Provide updated information to battlefield communities, particularly Kennett Square Borough and Kennett, East Marlborough, and Pennsbury Townships where the Landscapes are located as well as to New Castle County, DE. This information can be used in municipal histories, for historical commission resources identification and documentation purposes, and for educational and outreach efforts (e.g. Chester County Towns Tours & Village Walks). (CCPC)

3-7. Provide updated information to BBTF members, in particular its Steering Committee members who guide and lead the BBTF efforts. (CCPC)

3-8. Provide updated information to local heritage sites (e.g. Chester County Historical Society, and Brandywine Battlefield Park) and environmental stewardship organizations (e.g. Brandywine Red Clay Alliance), so they can incorporate the information into their historic interpretation, education, and stewardship outreach and efforts. (CCPC, municipal historical commissions, BBTF)

3-9. Provide updated information to land conservation groups (e.g. Brandywine Conservancy and Natural Lands) and Chester County Open Space Department for their use in coordinating and bolstering land conservation and open space preservation to enhance quality of life, and possible public access and interpretation of historic landscapes. (CCPC, municipalities, BBTF)

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